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Jurisdiction
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Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j),
whereby the defendant
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11953 as amended)

MI < i* i in i na I lU'.t. ion may take an appeal

from a conviction and final judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD Ut REVIEW
I

Hi (J t.he court err in failing to adequately instruct

l-ho jui'j i

uhe elements of attempted escape?

A correction of

error standard of review is applicable.
2,
d:i re the

Did the trial court err ii :i failing to adequately voir
1111 v""«"

«rrection of error standard oi review is

applicable.
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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of those statutes and constitutional provisions
that do not appear in the body of the brief are included in
Appendix A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Escape, a second degree felony
and convicted of Attempted

Escape, a third degree felony,

following a jury trial on May 7, 1990, before the Hon. Pat B.
Brian, a judge of the Third Judicial District Court.

Appellant

was sentenced to serve a consecutive sentence of not more than
five years at the Utah State Prison.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was charged with Escape in that he had been
committed to the Utah State Prison and was currently housed at
the Orange Street Community Correctional Center in Salt Lake
County.

The parties stipulated that appellant was serving a

term in the Utah State Prison of not more than five years for
theft.

Appellant was not present for a count at the Orange

Street Community Correctional Center on August 7, 1989 and could
not be located.

Eight (8) hours later, appellant was arrested

by authorities in California. T. 46-47.
Appellant claimed, as his defense, that his departure, as
had been previously stipulated, was necessary and justified.
T.48-84.

He testified that he was a witness to a racial riot
2

which took place in Salt Lake City In July 1982 wherein his best
friend was ki .led.

T

48

Appellant, testified, i n that matter,

against Danny Lucero, nicknamed "Tiger".
•that

testimony,

appellant was

T

*

as a

labeled

g

"snitch"

and

was

placed in protective custody six month1, after he arrived at the
prison.

T. 51-53, 59.

Wf

prison,

incidents

when

incident

appellant

safety

. or

was

-

-i

involved

, -

. •

J

several
ie

- appellant's throat.

such

Thereafter,

nsferred to the Orange Street facility. T S 3 .
Three days after he was allowed to go iitfo
his

own, appellant

was

approached

"Weasel

by

e knew

against Lucero.

an

l he cuiiiiiimi i I y on

individual

appellant

This individual threatened

t

had

known

as

testified

•'*'•"

"pel I ani

Mr. Simpson report/enJ the inc. oien I to one oi the

ounselors

unless he was given $1,000.00 a month. T.53-55,

at the half-way house.
was

The counselor was unaware that appellant

in protective custody and told him there was nothing that

could be done for his protection

T 'ib-56.,

She itly thereafter,

while appellant was waiting for a bus, he was again approached
"Weasel" and two other Hispanic males who asked
Appellant traveled on tl>' humoney

from

Appellant

hi s

testa

i

sister

on

hi Bo ml ilul,

his

way

to

:

California.

:-• .-r money.
sunic
'-58.

^d that he went to California because his lite

was iii danger and he did not believe i t IF aIJ it tor 11
would do anything to I lelp him.
3

In

rebuttal,

the

State

presented

appellant's sister, Colleen Bay.

the

testimony

of

Ms. Bay testified that on

Friday, she and appellant had arranged for him to come to her
house the following Monday and pick up an inheritance check from
her.

T. 90-91. Mr. Simpson arrived at 8:45 a.m. took the check

and left.
cashed

The State also presented evidence that Mr. Simpson

the

check

Centerville, Utah.

that

same

morning

at

Zion's

Bank

in

T. 94.

At a jury trial before the Hon. Pat Brian, a Judge of the
Third Judicial District Court, appellant's attorney attempted to
ask certain voir dire questions to the jury.
to

the

Court's

failure

prospective jury panel.

to

ask

certain

Counsel objected
questions

of

the

T. 32-34.

Counsel for appellant had further submitted to the Court a
jury Instruction concerning the lesser included offense of
Attempted Escape.

That instruction was submitted to the jury

and appellant was convicted of that lesser included offense and
sentenced to the Utah State Prison.

Appendix B.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Attempted

Escape instruction

failed

to adequately

instruct the jury as to the required elements of that lesser
included offense.

Although appellant was convicted of the

lesser included offense, he is entitled to a new trial or a
reversal

of

his

conviction

because

instruction.
4

of

that

defective

The Court's failure to inquire of the prospective jury
panel with the questions requested, both written and oral, from
appellant's counsel precluded her from assessing juror bias and
intelligently using her peremptory challenges.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE?
Instruction

20 (Appendix B) represented

lesser included offense of Attempted Escape.

the requested

This instruction

attempted to outline the elements of that offense once the jury
had determined that they could not convict appellant of the
underlying offense charged in the Information of Escape.
This Instruction is inadequate in that it fails to define
attempt and includes an incorrect mental state. (Appendix A, B;
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution; Article I, Section 7,
Utah Constitution.)
The trial court is required to accurately instruct the jury
as to the elements of an offense.

State v. Laine 618 P.2d 33,

(Utah 1980); State v. Lesley 672 P. 2d 79, (Utah 1983).
"An accurate instruction upon the basic
elements of the offense charged
is
essential, and the failure to so instruct
constitutes reversible error."
Laine, supra, at page 35.
Where a jury instruction misstates the applicable mental
state, reversal is required even though the party had failed to
5

obj ect.
In State v. Harmon, 712 P. 2d. 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court reviewed a jury instruction for Attempted Robbery
where the trial court merely inserted the word "attempted" in a
previously

prepared

elements

instruction

for the crime of

Robbery.

The Court held that the trial court

"failed to

instruct the jury on the specific elements of attempt" contained
in Utah Code Annotated Section 76-4-101 (1953 as amended) and
reversed the conviction, remanding it for a new trial.

The

court concluded:
"Specifically, the Court failed to instruct that
in order to convict of attempted robbery, the jury
must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's
conduct constituted a 'substantial step1 toward
commission of the offense and that the substantial
step must be f strongly corroborativef of defendantf s
intent to commit the offense.
Supra. at page 291.
The jury instruction in this case is almost identical to
Harmon.

The elements instruction for Attempted Escape contains

the word attempted but does not define the word or clarify that
the defendantf s conduct must represent a substantial step toward
the commission of the offense which is strongly corroborative of
defendant's intent to commit the underlying offense.

In order

to be guilty of an attempt, an individual must intend to commit
the underlying offense.
In State v. Norman, 580 P. 2d. 237 (Utah 1978), a case
involving Attempted Reckless Manslaughter, the Supreme Court
determined:
6

"An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with
the intent to commit that crime beyond mere
preparation but which falls short of actual
commission."
Supra, at page 238.
In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d. 390 (Utah 1989), involving an
appeal for attempted second degree murder and aggravated robbery
and the duel sentences imposed.

It gives further consideration

to the concept that in order to prove an attempt, there must
also be proof that your intention was to commit the underlying
offense and that substantial steps were taken that are strongly
corroborative of this intention.
Title 76, Chapter 4, Section 101 Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended) outlines the elements to consider in determining the
guilt of the defendant to attempt to commit an offense. First,
the actor must have the required mental state to commit the
underlying offense.
constituting
offense.

a

Secondly, the actor engages in conduct

substantial

step

toward

commission

of

the

Finally, in judging whether the actor engaged in a

substantial step, his actions must be strongly corroborative of
an intent to commit the underlying offense. (Appendix A and B. )
None of these concepts were adequately outlined for the
jury within the instruction.
The

instruction

instruction

for

the

is practically
underlying

identical

offense

of

to the jury
escape.

The

instruction is inadequate, and appellant is entitled to a new
trial or reversal of the conviction.

7

POINT II
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING
TO ADEQUATELY VOIR DIRE THE JURY?
Counsel for appellant submitted written voir dire questions
to the Court to facilitate her ability to judge juror bias.

An

objection was made to the Court's failure to inquire of the jury
regarding their feelings about the penalty which may be imposed
by the court. Counsel also requested questions concerning juror
feeling about the proposed defense of necessity. Questions were
also requested concerning the juror feeling of prisoners in the
Utah State Prison and whether they felt pressure from criticism
if they acquitted appellant. Further questions involved probing
the prospective jury panel concerning their feelings of the
rights of prisoners to protection while incarcerated. (T. 3234.)

All these areas of inquiry were necessary to an informed

and adequate understanding of the prospective jury panel and
their ability to sit as jurors on this particular case.
The trial court, in refusing to ask these questions and
follow-up questions, as requested by counsel, which would have
aided in detecting juror bias, are the basis for determining
that

there

was

prejudicial

error

in

selecting

the

jury.

Consequently, the conviction in this matter should be reversed.
(Appendix A, Amendment XIV, United States Constitution; Article
I, Section 7, Constitution of the State of Utah.)
Voir dire plays an important role in protecting a criminal
defendant's right to an impartial jury.
8

In Rosales-Lopez v.

United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), the United States Supreme
Court stated:
"Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring
the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury will be honored.
Without an
adequate voir dire, the trial judge's responsibility
to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to
impartially follow the court's instructions and
evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. See Connor
v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (1895)."
Supra, at page 188.
Furthermore, a defendant's right to due process and a fair
trial requires that an adequate voir dire of the jury panel be
conducted in a criminal case. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439
(Utah 1983); State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439 (Utah 1988).
In Taylor, supra, the Utah Supreme Court ordered a new
trial where faulty recording equipment made it impossible for
that court to review the voir dire questions and answers and
therefore unable to decide appellant's claims regarding an
inadequate examination of the jurors. This decision emphasized
that voir dire has two purposes. They include the detection of
actual bias and collection of data to permit informed exercise
of the peremptory challenge.
In State v. Ball, 685 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 1984), an appeal for
driving under the influence of alcohol, the Utah Supreme Court
reiterated that:
"Voir dire examination has, as its proper
purposes, both the detection of actual bias and the
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the
peremptory challenge."
Citing Taylor, supra at page 1059.
9

In reaching its decision that the trial court erred in not
asking the potential jurors whether they did not drink alcoholic
beverages because of personal conviction or religious reasons,
the Supreme Court focused on the second purpose of voir dire.
This second purpose is the valuable function of the peremptory
challenge.

In Ball, the Court stated:

"Properly utilized, however, it may be seen that
the peremptory challenge performs a valuable function
in our jury system.
Its efficacy is necessarily
vitiated when a party is not permitted to gather
enough information for prospective jurors in order to
exercise his right intelligently."
Ball, supra, at 1059.
In State v. Worthen, 765 P. 2d 839 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
"Although a trial judge has some discretion in
limiting voir dire examination, State v. Bishop, 753
P. 2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988), that discretion should be
liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to
elicit information from prospective jurors."
Supra, at page 845.
In State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1990), this Court
reversed a defendantf s criminal conviction for rape where the
trial judge failed to ask the prospective jurors whether any of
them had friends or relatives employed in the County Attorney's
Office.
"Trial courts have broad discretion in managing
voir dire, but that discretion must be exercised in
favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice in
prospective j urors."
Supra, at page 472.

10

The questions propounded by counsel for appellant were
relevant and necessary to her ability to assist prospective
jurors and determine bias.

The court's failure to ask the

proposed questions represented reversible error.

CONCLUSION
The Court erred in instructing the jury inadequately in the
concept of Attempt as it relates to Escape. The instruction was
deficient in that it failed to properly define the "substantial
step" necessary

to have attempted

an offense.

Also, the

required mental state improperly focused on an intention to
attempt

the

offense

rather

than

intending

to

commit

the

underlying offense.
The Court erred in failing to adequately voir dire the jury
and thus prevented counsel from being able to reasonably assess
juror bias and exercise peremptory challenges.
For the foregoing, appellant is entitled to a new trial or
reversal of his conviction.
Dated this

/ y

day of February, 1991.

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

J{~

day of February, 1991.
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APPENDIX A

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship —
Due process of law —
Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTICLE I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
ARTICLE I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
PART 1
ATTEMPT
Title 76, Chapter 4, Section 101

Attempt - Elements

(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute
a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the
actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually
committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the
offense could have been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
1973
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 309 Escape -- Term for escape
from the state prison.
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from
official custody.
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if:
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly
weapon against any person to effect the escape;
or
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the state
prison. Otherwise, escape is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this section,
means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail, an
institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, or other
confinement pursuant to an order of the court. For purposes of
this section a person is deemed to be confined in the Utah state
prison if he has been sentenced and committed and the sentence
has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on
parole.
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping confinement in
the state prison shall commence from the time the actor would
otherwise have been discharged from the prison the term or terms
which he was serving.

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTION NO. Q
Before

you

can

convict

the

defendant,

CURTIS

GALEN

SIMPSON, of the crime of Escape from Official Custody you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about the 7th, of August, 1989, in Salt

Lake County, Utah, the defendant, CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON was under
official custody of the Utah State Prison.
2.

That

said

sentence

of

confinement

had

not

been

terminated.
3.

That said defendant escaped from official custody.

4.

That said escape was done knowingly or intentionally

by said defendant.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is your duty to convict the defendant.

On the other hand, if

the

one

evidence

has

failed

to

so establish

or

more

of

said

elements then you should find the defendant not guilty, and then
consider the lesser included offense of Attempted Escape.

0000S4

INSTRUCTION NO. ,2.0

If you find that the State has not proven any element of
the charge of Escape beyond a reasonable doubt, you may then
consider the elements to the crime of Attempted Escape.
The State has the burden of proving each element of this
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The elements of Attempted Escape

are:
1.

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1989, the

defendant, CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON, was in official custody at
the Orange Street Community Correctional Center.
2.

That on or about the 7th day of August, 1989, the

defendant attempted to escape from such official custody.
3.

That in so doing the defendant acted intentionally or

knowingly.
If you find that the State has failed to produce evidence
to prove any one or more of these essential elements to your
satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to
acquit the defendant.
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